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Abstract
Reputation systems enable consumers to evaluate the trustworthiness of business entities (retailers, sellers) over the
marketplace. In electronic marketplaces, the reputation of an business entity (retailer, seller) is computed by aggregating
the “trust-scores” assigned to her by the parties who have had transactions with her. Most reputation systems designed
for online marketplaces use all the available trust-scores to compute the reputation of business entity. However, in some
scenarios, the consumer may wish to compute the reputation of a business entity by considering the trust-scores from
a set of trustworthy participants, however, she does not want to disclose the identities of the users she trusts. There
are two privacy protection challenges in the design of this kind of personalized reputation system: 1) protecting the
set of trusted users of participants, and 2) protecting the trust-scores assigned by the participants in the trusted set.
In this paper, we present a novel framework for computing the personalized global reputation of a business entity by
considering the trust-scores from a set of trusted participants without disclosing identities of participants in the trusted
set and their trust-scores. To this extent, the participants share cryptograms of their trust-scores for the business entity
to the decentralized public bulletin board or tally center. These encrypted trust-scores are then used by the requester
to compute the personalized reputation score of the business entity without leaking private information of participants
in the system. We have analyzed the security and privacy properties of the scheme for the malicious adversarial model.
The protocol has a linear message complexity, which proves that the system can be deployed in a real setup where such
personalized recommendations may be required in practice. Furthermore, the system ensures correctness, privacy and
security of trust-scores of participants in the trusted set under the malicious adversarial model.
Keywords: Personalized Reputation System, Secure Multiparty Computation, Reputation among Trusted peers,
Personalized Recommendation, Online Marketplaces
1. Introduction
Online marketplaces have gained popularity over re-
cent years. In an online marketplace, consumers get to
purchase products and services from different retailers on
the same platform. The marketplace is responsible for the
management of consumers’ transactions, building a bridge
between consumers and retailers and ensuring the integrity
of each transaction. The marketplace asks consumers to
provide trust scores for the retailers they have interacted
with, once the products or services have been delivered to
them. The marketplace then aggregates the trust scores
collected from the users, corresponding to a particular re-
tailer to compute the aggregate trust or reputation score
of the retailer or service provider1. The aggregated repu-
tation score can assist consumers in deciding whether or
not to interact with that retailer. Thus, the Reputation
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1The terms entity, business entity, retailer, and service provider
refer to the business entity and are interchangeable. Similarly, the
terms users, consumers, customers are referring the consumers and
are also interchangeable.
system plays a vital role in the interest of the consumers,
protecting them from getting involved with perfidious en-
tities in the marketplace [1]. Various online marketplaces
(Amazon, eBay, Airbnb, Uber) collect feedbacks in the
form of binary (0,1) or discrete (1 star to 5 star) ratings
of their retailers from the users who have interacted with
those retailers. The aggregate rating score is then shown
at the retailer’s web profile to delineate her trustworthi-
ness. A high reputation scores implies that the retailer is
trustworthy with respect to her past transactions and a
low score suggests that she is somewhat not trustworthy.
The reputation systems used by many popular online
marketplaces like eBay, Amazon, Uber, and Airbnb oper-
ate in a centralized setting, i.e. users submit feedbacks
directly to the centralized system. The centralized system
then combines these feedback scores into the global trust
or reputation score. In this case, the centralized reputa-
tion system knows the private information of users (feed-
back values, identity of rater). Thus, this scheme only
achieves weak privacy preservation goal. Furthermore, the
centralized system requires that users should trust them
for the protection of their private information such as rat-
ing scores, which normally is not the case in any realistic
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setup as people are often reluctant to trust the centralized
system with their sensitive information due to concern of
misuse [2, 3, 4, 5]. Furthermore, the rating score in a cen-
tralized system is exposed to other users which also dis-
courages users from submitting negative ratings because of
fear of retaliation. In the context of online marketplaces,
the major privacy concern is to hide the feedback of con-
sumers, as such feedback can be used to learn the private
information of the user. If the online marketplaces publish
the rating scores along with real or pseudonymous identity
of users, then the adversary (insurance companies, agents)
can easily infer the purchasing patterns of consumers as
well as their likes and dislikes [2]. Further, the centralized
systems can also become malicious to sell private data of
consumers for the financial benefits or can be attacked by
the adversary for learning the private information of con-
sumers. Recently, it has been shown that an adversary
could learn the private information of consumers by cor-
relating the information of consumers from the eBay net-
work and their Facebook social network [2]. Furthermore,
if ratings of a certain consumer for certain special medical
products, medical specialists (sex specialists or other med-
ical specialists), or certain marketplaces (providing specific
services) are shown on the marketplace’s website, then the
adversary or another consumer could interpret which prod-
ucts the target consumer has recently bought or which spe-
cialist doctors he has visited recently. Exposure of this in-
formation would reveal sensitive information (such as par-
ticular health issues, purchased products, watched movies
etc.). The privacy of feedback provider can be protected by
encrypting the feedback values [6, 7, 8, 9, 10], but it comes
with inherent challenges of verifiability and accountability.
The existing reputation systems for online marketplaces
have three major shortcomings: 1) the raters submit their
ratings to the centralized system in a plain form which
makes users feel uncomfortable while rating others, specif-
ically providing negative ratings, 2) the reputation systems
do not consider all the available ratings while computing
the aggregated reputation of the service provider, and 3)
the aggregated reputation score is not verifiable. In a per-
sonalized and verifiable reputation system, any user of the
marketplace may wish to know the aggregate reputation
score of a particular service provider by considering the
trust scores from a certain set of trusted users without
disclosing the set of trusted users and without learning pri-
vate ratings of participants in trusted set. Furthermore,
the computed reputation value should be publicly verifi-
able without relying on any trusted system.
In this paper, we present the design of a novel decen-
tralized and personalized reputation aggregation system
called PrivRep that considers trust scores received from
a set of trusted feedback providers while computing the
aggregate reputation of a retailer or service provider. The
design of PrivRep enables privacy protection of feedback
providers. The system neither reveals the identities of the
users in the set of trusted users nor divulges their rating
scores. The architecture of PrivRep consists of three key
components: the raters (users), the marketplace (Repu-
tation Engine) and the public bulletin board or the tally
system. The design of PrivRep is based on the semantics of
homomorphic cryptographic system that enables feedback
providers to collaborate in a secure and privacy-preserving
fashion. To this extent, the feedback providers (users) ho-
momorphically encrypt their rating scores and post them
on the public bulletin board, which is digitally signed and
can be traced back to its source. In addition to the cryp-
tograms of rating scores, the feedback providers also pro-
vide non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to prove that
the rating scores provided by them are within the per-
missible range. The use of NIZK proof restricts the users
from acting maliciously to circumvent the reputation sys-
tem by providing out-of-bound ratings. The reputation
engine then computes personalized reputation by utilizing
the cryptograms in a personalized manner. The proto-
col meets privacy and correctness requirements under the
standard malicious adversarial model (in which feedback
providers not only try to provide out-of-range ratings but
also act curiously to learn the private information of oth-
ers).
The system comes with a unique trait that allows the
Reputation Engine (RE) to consider the feedbacks only
from a premeditated set of trustworthy feedback providers
without revealing whether their ratings are counted dur-
ing the computation of the final reputation or not. This
freedom, however, does not allow the reputation engine to
infringe the privacy of the users. It only allows a RE to
disregard the feedbacks of suspicious users without letting
them know about it. It is reasonable to assume that the
RE is owned by the marketplace and would calculate the
reputation of any service provider correctly as this has di-
rect implications on her own eminence. It is thus in the
interest of the reputation engine to only include the rat-
ings of trustworthy feedback providers while computing
the reputation of a service provider, discarding the rat-
ings provided by other users with suspicious intent. Our
scheme provides the required tool for achieving this sort
of personalization in a privacy-preserving manner.
In summary, this paper makes the following contribu-
tions.
1. We present a decentralized and personalized reputa-
tion aggregation system that computes personalized
reputation of particular service provider.
2. We analyze the privacy and security properties of
our scheme under the malicious adversarial model.
3. We empirically evaluate the communication and com-
putation overheads of the system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we discuss the related work and compare our approach
with other systems. In Section 3, we provide a background
on the reputation systems and the homomorphic encryp-
tion technique used for developing our proposed protocol.
In Section 4, we present the overview of the proposed ap-
proach and detail its operations. In Section 6, we analyze
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the security and privacy properties of the proposed system.
In Section 7, we empirically evaluate the computation and
communication overheads of the system and compare it
with other closely related systems in 8. We conclude the
paper in Section 9.
2. Related work
A number of proposals have been presented in the con-
text of privacy-preserving reputation management in a
peer to peer network and online marketplace. These sys-
tems can be clustered into two major classes: systems
that ensure the privacy of consumers through the use of a
trusted third party systems, and systems that ensure pri-
vacy via the use of homomorphic cryptographic systems.
The centralized reputation system (used in many online
marketplaces, such as Amazon, eBay, Alibaba, uber etc.)
collects feedbacks from users in the form of rating scores
(for example 0, 1, -1 in eBay, 0-5 star ratings in amazon
etc.) and the free text comments. These feedback scores
are then added together to yield the aggregate reputation
of retailers over the marketplace. Section 3.1 provides a de-
tailed discussion on the reputation systems used in online
marketplaces. In the centralized system, the consumer has
to trust the marketplace for the protection of his private
data, which is a major privacy concern for the consumers.
The centralized system addresses privacy of users through
the use of pseudonymous identities [11, 8, 12]. However,
pseudonymous identities cannot provide absolute privacy
protection as user ratings can be correlated with user data
from other sources to infer what a target user is buying
in a particular online marketplace. Further, the feedback
scores are exposed (in plaintext form) to a trusted system
and other users as well. This may cause users to shy away
from providing negative rating because of the fear of re-
taliation from other feedback providers [13]. Although a
trusted party ensures privacy protection to some extent,
it still poses serious privacy threat when the third party
itself becomes malicious or gets compromised. Further, in
online marketplaces and P2P (peer to peer) networks, it
is more important to protect feedback ratings rather than
the identity of the user. The privacy of users can also be
protected by a onetime anonymization [14, 15, 9, 16] but
anonymization would not provide any meaningful recom-
mendation to other users of the system. Furthermore, the
anonymization can also be subject to de-anonymization by
correlating information from multiple sources [4, 3].
Several decentralized reputation systems have been pro-
posed for reputation management. Largely, these systems
are based on the use of secure multiparty computation
and differential privacy. In [17] Schaub et al. proposed
a blockchain-based reputation system in which consumers
submit their unlinkable ratings of the marketplace or ser-
vice provider they have interacted recently with. The
credentials are issued by the service provider itself thus
is prone to be misused by the malicious service provider
to increase his reputation via feedback stuffing. Further,
the system does not provide any personalized aggregation.
In [18] Blo¨mer et al. presented a secure and anonymous
reputation system based on the semantics of group sig-
nature schemes developed by Boneh et al. [19]. The sys-
tem provides anonymity by generating anonymous signed
ratings. However, if the consumer provides a rating for
the same product more than once, then his identity can
be de-anonymized along with the ratings. In [20] Busom
et al. protected ratings of the feedback provider through
anonymization and by allowing only authorized consumers
to participate in the rating process.
In [21] Hasan et al. proposed a system based on an
additive homomorphic cryptography semantics and Zero-
Knowledge proofs. The privacy of a given user can be pre-
served even in the presence of a large number of malicious
users. However, the system requires a preselected set of
users for protecting the privacy of the users. In [22] Pavlov
et al. presented three different protocols that protect pri-
vacy by hiding the values of the responses submitted by
the feedback providers. These protocols operate within a
minimal system complexity where raters are honest but
curious. The system has a computationally complexity of
O(n3) messages for witness selection within a malicious
adversarial model.
In [23] Dolev et al. presented a distributed approach
for calculating a user’s trustworthiness in specific time win-
dow by aggregating scores upon the request of an initiator.
The scheme operates in a distributed manner, where each
user calculates its trust value privately and independently.
Though the protocol does not depend on a trusted third
party, it does require the protocol initiator to be honest
for ensuring the preservation of privacy and security prop-
erties of the protocol. In [24] Dimitriou et al. proposed a
decentralized protocol that preserves privacy of feedback
providers under the semi-honest adversarial model. The
protocol allows participants to securely present their rat-
ings in a way that preserves the privacy of individual rat-
ings. In [6] Clark et al. proposed a delegation protocol for
the users who want to leave the network. The designed
protocol enables exiting participants to delegate their task
of providing feedback scores to a set of other users in the
network without affecting the privacy of the user who is
delegating and the user who acted as the delegate. In
[25, 26, 27] Azad et al. presented a decentralized reputa-
tion aggregation protocol for the weighted aggregation of
reputation scores provided by the participants. Though
the protocol considers the trust weights, it includes all the
participants in the aggregation process. In [28] Visan et
al. proposed a secure protocol for computing the reputa-
tion of peers in a peer to peer network using cryptographic
systems and the anonymous identities.
A few proposals have also been proposed targeting de-
centralized marketplaces. In [29], Stefanos et al. proposed
a reputation system for the decentralized marketplaces
where the trust value the user gives to another user is
quantifiable and is expressed as a bitcoin wallet. The sys-
tem is completely decentralized and is based on the seman-
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Figure 1: Transaction and Reputation Flow work for the Online
Marketplaces.
tics of risks that how much a user would lose if she trusts
someone and she behaves selfishly later on. However, it
does not provide any information about which user is re-
puted in the network and how users’ feedback is aggregated
in the network. In [7] a decentralized anonymous market-
place is proposed that uses public ledger based consensus
to aggregate the reputation of retailers while preserving
the privacy of users. In [30] Moreno-Sanchez et al. pro-
posed a secure privacy-preserving protocol that protects
privacy of receiver and its value in a credit networks with
the use of transaction obliviousness.
The existing systems have some limitations. Firstly,
they require all the users to be online at the time of ag-
gregation process (because they are primarily designed for
P2P networks), therefore are not suitable for the online
marketplaces. Secondly, they are secure under honest but
curious adversarial model (rater provides honest rating).
Therefore, they do not provide any defense when raters
are collaborating with the service provider to increase her
reputation in a malicious model. Thirdly, these systems
are not providing personalized aggregation based on the
interest or relationship network of the user requesting the
aggregation.
To the best of our knowledge, no work has been pre-
sented that computes the personalized reputation of ser-
vice providers in a marketplace while ensuring the privacy
of feedback providers. The work presented in this paper
has the following properties: 1) it considers feedback scores
provided by a set of trusted users without disclosing who is
trusted and who is not, 2) the system protects the privacy
of participants under the malicious adversary model, 3) the
protocol operations are performed in a decentralized way
without no central trusted party learning individual user
feedback, and 4) the system has a linear computational
complexity which in itself is an improvement over other
systems. Furthermore, the system can also be applied in a
decentralized marketplace for the reputation management
[31, 32].
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we discuss different aspects of a repu-
tation system and describe cryptographic primitives that
are essential in the design of the PrivRep reputation man-
agement system.
3.1. Marketplace Reputation Systems
Reputation represents collective information about the
trustworthiness of users and retailers in the online mar-
ketplace. The reputation of a given retailer or user at
the marketplace is computed as the sum or average of the
feedback ratings assigned to retailers by their buyers based
on the past transactions [33, 34]. In the marketplace the
feedback ratings can be represented on the scale of {0, -
1, 1} (eBay marketplace), 0-5 star (Amazon marketplace)
that is assigned to each attribute describing the perfor-
mance of a retailer. The attributes can be the information
about whether the retailer has delivered the product on
time, whether the product is the same as what is listed
on the retailer’s page and quality of services etc. Figure
1 shows the flow of events that take place in the market-
place when a consumer submits the purchase order to a
particular retailer. When the product is delivered to the
consumer, the online marketplace asks the consumer for
the feedback against her recent interaction with the re-
tailer. The user reports a feedback rating for the retailer
and the marketplace then adds this trust score to the ag-
gregated reputation of the retailer and displays this value
on the web-page designated for the retailer.
Reputation systems can assist consumers to evaluate
the trustworthiness of other retailers or users (consumer to
consumer marketplaces or P2P) before making the trans-
action with a retailer or a user. This would also boost the
sales for a particular retailer as well as people’s trust on the
marketplace if the reputation is well conceived and accu-
rate in its functionality. The reputation system can be im-
plemented as a centralized system or a distributed system
depending on the requirement. In electronic marketplaces,
the reputation systems are the centralized ones, where all
the data regarding the rating history of the user is held
by the central system. This is the normal practice that is
being used in popular reputation systems (Amazon, eBay,
Airbnb, uber etc.). On the other hand in P2P network, the
reputation systems can be distributed [35, 36, 37] where
user ratings are retained within the peers and used on-
demand upon request from other peers. Table 1 presents
a list of various reputation systems used in popular on-
line marketplaces and P2P networks, classified according
to their implementation-styles.
3.2. Secure Multiparty Computation
Secure Multiparty Computation enables computation
of a mathematical function over inputs from multiple data
providers, in a secure and privacy-preserving way. The
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System Architecture Rating Personalized
Amazon Centralized 0-5 No
eBay Centralized 0,1,-1 No
Bizrate Centralized 0,1 No
Uber Centralized 0-5 No
Airbnb Centralized 0-5 No
Bazzar Decentralized 0-5 No
Gunetella Distributed 0,1 Yes
PrivRep Decentralized 0,1 (0-5) Yes
Table 1: Comparison of online reputation systems
computation would not reveal anything about the pri-
vate data held by other parties involved in the compu-
tation. Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) has been
applied in a wide range of privacy-related problems like
online e-voting [38, 39], statistical data analysis with pri-
vacy [40, 41, 42, 43], and privacy preserving user analyt-
ics [44, 45]. In SMC, we have a number of parties, say
p1, p2, . . . , pn , each with a private input x1, x2, . . . , xn , re-
spectively. The parties would like to compute a function
(sum, average etc.) of their inputs, say f (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
without revealing their individual inputs to others. The
system performs computation over the ciphertext and the
final result matches the computation performed over the
corresponding plain text.The SMC computation consists of
three major algorithms: Key generation — responsible for
generating public and private keys given security param-
eters, Encryption — responsible for generating the cipher
text corresponding to the plain text using the public key,
Decryption — responsible for deciphering the final result
from the encrypted data using the private key.In this pa-
per, we consider the additively homomorphic encryption
system that does not rely on the trusted system for crypto-
graphic operations while ensuring privacy of participants.
3.3. Cryptographic Building Blocks
The cryptographic primitive underpinning PrivRep uses
the feedback randomization technique proposed for the de-
centralized and verifiable electronic voting [39, 46]. Let
N = {1, 2, . . . ,n} be the set of users in the network hold-
ing the feedback scores (0,1) for a certain retailer at the
marketplace or online business. Let there be a DSA (or
ECDSA)-like multiplicative cyclic group Z∗q , where q is
a large prime. Let p be another large prime such that
p | q−1. Let there be a subgroup G of order p of the group
Z∗q , and let g be a generator of G . In order to provide the
feedback for the business entity or retailer, the feedback
provider first gets the unique token from the marketplace
or business entity, then it generates a random value (pri-
vate key) Ski ∈ Zp for i ∈ N . The user then generates
and publishes the public keys Pk to the PBB as follows.
Pki = g
Ski
When all the registered users in the system have gener-
ated and published their public keys on the public bulletin
board (PBB), the encryption key (restructured key) of the
user is computed as follows:
Yi =
∏
j∈N ,j<i
Pkj
/ ∏
j∈N ,j>i
Pkj
The computation of Yi as above ensures that∏
i∈N
Y Skii = 1. (1)
Equation 1 ensures that Y Skii can be used as a random-
izer for computing the secret feedbacks. This property is
crucial to the design of our system. Anyone in the sys-
tem is able to compute Yi based on the published Pkj
values of other users Pj ; i ∈ [1,n]\{i} and her own secret
key Ski . The Y
′
i s are used in our scheme to randomize the
feedbacks provided by the users. This randomization tech-
nique serves as an encryption method that allows the RE
to compute the aggregate of all feedbacks without learning
anything about the individual feedbacks. We do not need
any trusted party to de-randomize the encrypted feedbacks
as simple multiplication of the encrypted feedbacks will do
that as Equation 1 shows. This property is key to design-
ing our decentralized scheme for reputation management.
3.4. Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof
A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK), is a
zero-knowledge proof of the statement where the sender
(prover) can prove to the receiver (verifier) that a given
statement is true, without revealing any information other
than the fact that the statement is indeed correct. In
PrivRep, we use NIZK proofs to prove the knowledge of
secret parameters chosen by different participants, as well
as to prove the well-formedness of different cryptograms.
For generating a non-interactive proof we have applied the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic to a standard zero-knowledge proof
[47].
3.5. Public bulletin board
PBB is an implementation of a public authenticated
channel. It is the storage that holds the public keys, en-
crypted feedback scores and other public information from
the participants. Specifically, the PBB has the following
information: the participant’s public key, the identity of
the business entity, encrypted feedback scores assigned by
the participant, and the associated NIZK proofs and other
crucial data associated with the protocol. The participants
of the protocol have write access to the PBB, whereas,
anyone else can only read data from it. Every datagram
posted on the PBB has an associated signature that serves
to prove the data authenticity. The adversary having ac-
cess to the PBB would not be able to learn the individual
feedback scores; instead the adversary would only learn the
aggregated statistics about the business entity, like the RE
and all the users. The PBB can also be a tally server held
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by the marketplace since all operations performed by the
PBB are based on public data inputs and are publicly ver-
ifiable. The use of PBB is common in privacy-preserving
recommendation systems [48, 42] as well as in electronic
voting systems [38, 39, 49].
3.6. Problem Definition
Here, the problem is to compute personalized reputa-
tion of the retailer in the online marketplace in a privacy-
preserving and decentralized fashion. There are two dis-
tinct ways of viewing the problem. First, let us assume
that the marketplace wishes to calculate the reputation of
any service provider on the basis of the quantitative feed-
backs provided by the users. The marketplace wants every
user to participate in the process but wants to exclude the
feedbacks provided by some users she does not consider
trustworthy. These unreliable users may be floated by the
retailer or a contender of the retailer to influence the out-
come of the protocol in favor/ against the service provider
in question. The marketplace can identify fake users by
analyzing their purchasing patterns. Now, one trivial so-
lution to this problem is to allow only trustworthy users to
participate in the computation of the reputation. However,
in order to do that, the marketplace will have to reveal the
identities of trustworthy users which will, in turn, reveal
the identities of suspicious users too. The marketplace
cannot presumably be 100% accurate in deciding whether
a user is trustworthy or not. Hence, revealing the list of
users whom she considers suspicious may not go down well
with the community of users. For example, a user who has
recently joined the marketplace may be deemed as ‘not-a-
trustworthy-user’ by the marketplace. On the other hand,
an old-timer with a clean record can be considered as a
trustworthy user. As such, other retailers may be skep-
tical about engaging with a user who is not deemed as
trustworthy. This imposes the need to hide the identities
of suspicious users. Therefore, the marketplace will need
to allow all the users to participate in the above compu-
tation. However, the marketplace may be inclined to per-
form the above computation in such a fashion that gives
her a degree of freedom to exclude the feedbacks of some
of the ‘not-trustworthy’ users while keeping their identities
secret. Our personalized reputation just serves this pur-
pose. It allows every user to give feedbacks corresponding
to a service provider. It also gives a degree of freedom
to the marketplace to exclude suspicious users’ feedbacks
without requiring to reveal anything to any of the users
and more importantly, without being able to compromise
their privacy.
An alternative way of viewing this problem is the fol-
lowing. Let, U be the set of users, and R be the set of
retailers in the marketplace. The users purchase products
from the retailer via marketplace and leave feedback rat-
ing to the marketplace for their transactions. Let there be
a new user ui ∈ U who wishes to calculate the personal-
ized reputation of a particular retailer. The personalized
reputation presents the aggregated view about the retailer
according to the trusted friends of ui . To this extent, ui
has to expose a list of his friends F to the marketplace for
the personalized aggregation. However, ui wants to ensure
that neither the marketplace nor other users should be able
to learn the list of her trusted friends. The proposed decen-
tralized approach computes the personalized reputation of
the retailer in a privacy-preserving way without disclosing
the identities of the trusted friends of ui .
In this paper, we have modeled the solution so as to
address the first problem where the marketplace computes
the personalized reputation of a service provider. However,
it is trivial to adapt the scheme to yield a potential solution
for the second problem too.
4. PrivRep System Design
This section presents an overview of the PrivRep sys-
tem. Here, we describe various components of the PrivRep
system, the adversarial model and the assumptions made
in this paper.
4.1. System Components
Our Reputation system is composed of three different
types of entities: users, service providers and the reputa-
tion engine (RE). The users are buyers who rate the service
providers. The owner of the marketplace is the controller
of the reputation engine. For example, in an online mar-
ketplace like Amazon and eBay, the users are the buyers,
the retailers are service providers, and the marketplace
itself (Amazon/eBay) is the handler of the reputation en-
gine. Users rate their interacted services on a scale of 0 to
1. The reputation engine aggregates all the ratings from
participants and calculates an overall personalized reputa-
tion of a service provider in the marketplace.
4.2. Threat Model
As discussed above, there are three different compo-
nents in the system: user, the reputation engine, and the
service provider. Our system should have a built-in mech-
anism to preserve the privacy of all users i.e. the system
must ensure that the ratings provided by the users will re-
main private to the individual users and only the aggregate
reputation which is calculated from these private ratings
should be known publicly. This should hold true even in
the case when the adversary has compromised the reputa-
tion engine and a number of users. The reputation engine
should ensure that no service provider can artificially in-
crease its rating by creating a large number of fake users
and using them to influence the outcome of the reputation
algorithm in its favor.
Similarly, it is also required that no malicious service
provider can use feedback stuffing to reduce the rating of a
contender. In order to achieve this, the scheme gives some
degree of freedom to the reputation engine to exclude rat-
ings of suspicious users without letting them about their
exclusion. For example, if there are n users, the reputation
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engine may choose ∆ users whom she considers trustwor-
thy and discard the ratings given by the remaining n −∆
users. Hence, the scheme provides freedom to the RE to
choose some ∆ users who will ultimately have a say in the
actual calculation of the reputation of a service provider.
The scheme assumes that the reputation engine does have
such a mechanism to identify the set of users [50]. The
scheme protects the privacy of users whose ratings are dis-
carded. It also protects the ratings of trusted users whose
rating are counted, as long as the overall reputation com-
puted from them does not breach that privacy. If ∆ is
large enough, a user can be assured that her privacy will
be preserved even when the overall reputation is published.
4.3. Assumptions
Every entity involved in the protocol agrees on a cyclic
group G of p elements, p being a prime number. G is pub-
licly known. Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is assumed
to be hard in G . Also, there is a publicly known generator
g ∈ G . There is a publicly accessible bulletin board (simi-
lar to the one used in [39, 42, 49]), where the participants
of the protocol can upload any information they may like
to share with everyone else. This bulletin board acts as a
notice board where only participants of the protocol can
make a post. Each such posted data is digitally signed by
the user who owns it. The user’s public key can be used
to check the authenticity of the posted data. Again, the
bulletin board is ‘append-only’. Hence, no user is allowed
to overwrite any information posted either by herself or by
any other user.
5. Protocol Operations
The feedback represents the trust-value a participant
intends to assign to the service provider. The RE wants to
compute the personalized reputation of a service provider
by considering the ratings of a pre-selected set of trusted
users. A rating is either 0 or 1. Though, here we consider
only binary inputs from the users, the reputation scheme
can be easily extended to allow any rating between 0 and
a small integer. Our protocol allows the RE to execute
an MPC protocol in a network comprising n users in such
a fashion that only the ratings of a finite subset of the
n users will be included in the final tally and the ratings
of all other users will be discarded secretly and none of
the n users will have any clue about whether her rating
is counted or excluded. In order to make it fair, the RE
needs to prove to the users that the number of actual users
whose ratings will be counted is equal to a given number,
say ∆. Also, the RE will have the privilege of choosing the
users whose ratings will be counted at the end. We call
them ‘trusted users’ throughout this paper. Let us assume
there are n users, designated as Pi : i ∈ [n]. The RE will
be able to calculate this tally S =
∑n
i=1 I (i) · vi , where
vi ∈ {0, 1} is Pi ’s secret rating for the service provider SP
and
I (i) =
{
1, if i ∈ Γ
0, if i ∈ [n] \ Γ (2)
Here, Γ is the set of indices of the users trusted by
the RE. Hence, Γ ⊆ [n]. Thus, the RE wants to calculate
S =
∑
i∈Γ vi , where vi , the secret of of Pi , i ∈ [n] is defined
below:
vi =
{
1, if Pi recommends the service provider
0, if Pi does not recommend the service provider
Upon completion of the process, the tally S will be
computed as described in later sections. Once S is com-
puted, the overall reputation/rating of the service provider
SP on a scale of 1 to 10 can be calculated as : b10∗S/∆e.
Now, we begin describing the protocol operations. There
is a public bulletin board which is a publicly accessible
web-page on which every participant of the protocol posts
their public information including public keys and/or en-
crypted ratings, Zero Knowledge proofs etc. Any infor-
mation posted on the bulletin board by any participant
cannot be overwritten. Again, those who do not partici-
pate in the protocol have only read access to the bulletin
board. The protocol works as follow.
The RE generates two random values ω1, ω2 ∈ Zp and
publishes σ1 = g
ω1 and σ2 = g
ω2 . The RE also publishes
NIZK proofs of knowledge of ωi = logg σi for i = 1, 2. This
NIZK proofs can be constructed using Schnorr signature
scheme [39]. Every user Pi , i ∈ [n] generates a random
a1i , b1i ∈ Zp , and publishes ga1i and gb1i on the bulletin
board. They also publish NIZK proofs of knowledge of
a1i , b1i using Schnorr’s signature method. Thereafter, the
RE generates two values as equation 3 and 4 :
ga2i = g(I (i)−a1iω1)/ω2 = (gI (i)/ga1iω1)1/ω2 (3)
and
gb2i = g(1−b1iω1)/ω2 = (g/gb1iω1)1/ω2 (4)
where I (i) is the value from equation 2. Further, the
RE also publishes Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof
as
PW 1i
[
g
∑2
j=1 ajiωj ∈ {1, g} : ga1i , ga2i , gω1 , gω2
]
This NIZK proof comprises a witness to the fact that
g
∑2
j=1 ajiωj is either 1 or g , given ga1i , ga2i , gω1 and gω2 .
The RE publishes this proof for all users Pi , i ∈ [n]. The
RE also publishes another NIZK proof as
PWtotal
[
g
∑n
i=1
∑2
j=1 ajiωj = g∆ : ga1i , ga2i , gω1 , gω2
]
This proof consists of a witness to the fact that | {i :
g
∑2
j=1 ajiωj = g} |= ∆, given ga1i , ga2i ,∀ i ∈ [n], gω1 and
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gω2 . In other words PWtotal proves that ∆ is the total
number of users whose ratings count at the end. The RE
publishes a final NIZK proof to prove the fact that ∀ i ∈
[n], g
∑2
j=1 bjiωj equals g , given gb1i , gb2i , i ∈ [n], gω1 and
gω2 . This proof is constructed as:
PW 2i
[
g
∑2
j=1 bjiωj = g : gb1i , gb2i , gω1 , gω2
]
,∀ i ∈ [n]
The detail description for constructing these NIZK proofs
is provided in the Appendix section.
In the next step, every user Pi , i ∈ [n] generates a se-
cret key Ki = (x1i , x2i) and publishes Pubi = (g
x1i , gx2i ).
The user publishes NIZK proofs of knowledge of the se-
cret keys using Schnorr signature scheme [39]. Once all
the users have published their public keys, then every
user Pi , i ∈ [n], computes the restructured keys (Y1i ,Y2i),
where
Yji = g
yji =
i−1∏
k=1
gxjk /
n∏
k=i+1
gxjk ; j = 1, 2 (5)
Note that, the restructured keys can be computed by any
user after downloading the public keys of other users from
the bulletin board. The user Pi then computes a vector
Ci = (c1i , c2i), where cji = Y
xji
ji g
bjiαi gajivi =
gxjiyji gbjiαi gajivi , j = 1, 2, αi ∈R Zp is chosen by Pi and
vi is the secret rating of Pi . The Pi uploads the feedback
(〈Ci , gαi 〉) and a NIZK proof of well-formedness as:
PW 3i
[
Ci : g
x1i , gx2i , gy1i , gy2i , gb1i , gb2i , gαi , gb1i , gb2i
]
This NIZK proof provides a witness to the fact that each
cji , j = 1, 2 is of the form g
xjiyji gbjiαi gajivi , where gx1i , gx2i , gy1i ,
gy2i , gb1i , gb2i , gαi , gb1i , gb2i are given and vi ∈ {0, 1}. In
other words, the NIZK proof proves that either of the two
statements is correct but not both.
1) c1i = g
x1iy1i gb1iαi ∧ c2i = gx2iy2i gb2iαi
2) c1i = g
x1iy1i gb1iαi ga1i ∧ c2i = gx2iy2i gb2iαi ga2i
It is easy to see that the first statement corresponds to
the case: vi = 0, whereas the second one corresponds to
the case: vi = 1. The detailed construction of this NIZK
proof is provided in the Appendix section.
Now, after the last user Pn (say) has uploaded her
cryptogram Cn , anyone can compute C = (cˆ1, cˆ2), where
cˆj =
n∏
i=1
cji (6)
=
n∏
i=1
gxjiyji gajivi gbjiαi (7)
= g
∑n
i=1 ajivi g
∑n
i=1 bjiαi (8)
Then, RE calculates an intermediate variable as
L = (cˆ1)
ω1(cˆ2)
ω2 (9)
= g
∑n
i=1 vi (a1iω1+a2iω2)g
∑n
i=1 αi (b1iω1+b2iω2) (10)
Note that a1iω1+a2iω2 = 1,∀ i ∈ Γ and a1iω1+a2iω2 =
0,∀ i ∈ [n] \ Γ. Also b1iω1 + b2iω2 = 1,∀ i ∈ Γ. Hence,
L = g
∑
i∈Γ vi
n∏
i=1
gαi = gS
n∏
i=1
gαi (11)
The RE publishes L along with a NIZK proof of knowl-
edge
PWT [L : cˆ1, cˆ2, g
ω1 , gω2 ]. This proof provides a witness to
the fact that L = (cˆ1)
ω1(cˆ2)
ω2 , given cˆ1, cˆ2, g
ω1 and gω2 .
Since the values of gαi are publicly known for all i ∈ [1,n],
anyone can calculate gS = L/
∏n
i=1 g
αi , and from this can
find the value of S through brute force search. Brute force
search will be feasible, since, S ∈ [0,∆].
The algorithmic steps of the protocol are outlined be-
low. There are two phases of the protocol: the feedback
collection phase and the tally phase. Figure 2 depicts the
steps of the protocol. These steps are described below:
Phase I : Collecting Feedbacks.
Step I: The RE selects random ω1, ω2 ∈ Zp and publishes
σ1 = g
ω1 and σ2 = g
ω2 . She also publishes NIZK
proofs of knowledge of logg σ1 and logg σ2 computed
using Schnorr signature protocol [39].
Step II: Each user Pi , i ∈ [n] selects random a1i , b1i ∈
Zp and publishes ga1i and gb1i . Pi also publishes
NIZK proofs of knowledge of the two random num-
bers computed using Schnorr signature protocol [39].
Step III: ∀ i ∈ [n] the RE computes ga2i = (gI (i)/ga1iω1)1/ω2
and gb2i = (g1−I (i)/gb1iω1)1/ω2 , where I (i) is de-
scribed above. The RE publishes ga2i and gb2i along
with the non-interactive zero knowledge proofs
PW 1i
[
g
∑2
j=1 ajiωj ∈ {1, g} : ga1i , ga2i , gω1 , gω2
]
, and
PW 2i
[
g
∑2
j=1 bjiωj = g : ga1i , ga2i , gω1 , gω2
]
,∀ i ∈ [n].
The RE also publishes another NIZK proof
PWtotal
[
g
∑n
i=1
∑2
j=1 ajiωj = g∆ : gb1i , gb2i , gω1 , gω2
]
.
This Zero-knowledge proof proves that the total num-
ber of trusted users is ∆.
Step IV: Each user Pi selects a random key (x1i , x2i) ∈
Z2p and publishes the public key Pubi = (gx1i , gx2i )
along with the NIZK proof of knowledge of the corre-
sponding secret key computed by means of Schnorr
signature protocol [39].
Step V: Each user Pi selects random αi ∈ Zp and pub-
lishes a feedback 〈Ci , gαi 〉, where Ci = (c1i , c2i), cji =
Y
xji
ji g
bjiαi gajivi = gxjiyji gbjiαi gajivi , j = 1, 2, Yji is as
defined in equation 5 and vi is the secret rating of Pi .
This feedback is published by Pi . Pi also publishes
a NIZK proof
PW 3i
[
Ci : g
x1i , gx2i , gy1i , gy2i , gb1i , gb2i , gαi , gb1i , gb2i
]
as mentioned above.
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Figure 2: Flow diagram of the PrivRep protocol
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Phase II : Computing the Overall Reputation.
Step I: The RE computes C = (cˆ1, cˆ2), where cˆj =
∏n
i=1 cji
=
∏n
i=1 g
xjiyji gajivi gbjiαi = g
∑n
i=1 ajivi g
∑n
i=1 bjiαi , for
j = 1, 2. Then, the RE calculates L = (cˆ1)
ω1(cˆ2)
ω2 =
gS
∏n
i=1 g
αi . Then the RE publishes L along with a
NIZK proof of well-formedness of L.
Step II: Anyone can calculate gS = L/ (
∏n
i=1 g
αi ) and
from it can compute S via brute force search tech-
nique.
6. Security and Privacy Analysis
In this section, we prove the security properties of our
scheme.
• The privacy of an untrusted user cannot be breached
even if the RE and all the other users collude against
her.
• Users cannot find whether they are considered as
trusted or untrusted by the reputation system.
• The privacy of a trusted user is preserved if the over-
all tally does not allow the RE to deduce her rating.
The tally has to be made public at the end, or the
RE has to be able to compute the tally. If the tally
on its own does not expose the rating of a trusted
user, then her rating cannot be deduced. However,
if everyone colludes against a trusted user, then the
tally will be sufficient to find her rating which can
be obtained by subtracting the tally by the partial
tally of all colluding user. However, if the adversary
cannot find her rating from the tally itself (i.e. if
the adversary cannot collude with all ∆− 1 trusted
users), then her privacy cannot be infringed upon.
Note that, we have distinguished between the privacy of
trusted and untrusted users. The ratings of untrusted
users are not included in the tally but the ratings of the
trusted ones are. So, the tally which is made public at the
end will be based upon the ratings of trusted users. Like
any election if the adversary colludes with all the ∆ − 1
other trusted users, finding the rating of the non-colluding
user is trivial. However, since the rating of an untrusted
user is not included in the tally and since our cryptographic
protocol does not leak any data, the rating of an untrusted
user cannot be found even if everyone colludes against her.
In Section 6.1, we show the first property of our privacy-
preserving reputation scheme. In Section 6.2, we show that
the second property is satisfied by our scheme, and lastly
in Section 6.3 we show that the third property holds for
our scheme.
6.1. Privacy of an Untrusted User
The main result of our first privacy-preserving prop-
erty is Lemma 3. In this lemma, we show that no adver-
sary will be able to compromise the secret rating of a user
whose rating is made to be discarded. That is, if the RE
chosen not include the rating of a certain user, her rating
can not be deduced by any means. We use Assumption
3 to prove Lemma 3. In Lemma 2 and 1, we prove that
Assumption 3 follows directly from the DDH (Decisional
Diffie–Hellman) assumption. Hence, Lemma 3 holds under
the DDH assumption.
Assumption 1. DDH Assumption [51]: Given g , ga , gb
and Ω ∈ {gab ,R}, where R $← G it is hard to distinguish
whether Ω = gab or Ω = R.
Assumption 2. Given g , ga , gb and Ω ∈ {gabga , gab} it
is hard to find whether Ω = gabga or Ω = gab .
Lemma 1. Assumption 1 implies assumption 2.
Proof. According to assumption 1, (g , ga , gb , gab)
c≈ (g , ga ,
gb ,R). Similarly, (g , ga , gb , gabga)
c≈ (g , ga , gb ,R′ ∗ ga) c≈
(g , ga , gb ,R′). Thus, (g , ga , gb , gab)
c≈ (g , ga , gb ,R) c≈
(g , ga , gb ,R′)
c≈ (g , ga , gb , gabga).
Assumption 3. Given g , ω1, ω2, g
a1 , ga2 , gb1 , gb2 , gα, sat-
isfying ω1a1 + ω2a2 = 0, ω1b1 + ω2b2 = 1, it is computa-
tionally hard to distinguish A and B, where A and B are
given on Table 2.
gb1αga1 gb1α
gb2αga2 gb2α
A B
Table 2: Values of A and B in assumption 3.
Lemma 2. Assumption 2 implies assumption 3.
Proof. Let us assume that there is an adversary A that can
distinguish between A and B . We show how we can con-
struct an adversary A′ which with the help of A can break
the security of the assumption 2. A′ receives g , ga , gb , gc
and Ω ∈ {gabgc , gab} as input. A′ has to find whether
Ω = gabgc or Ω = gab . A′ works as follows:
it implicitly sets b1 = a, α = b, a1 = c. It selects ran-
dom ω1, ω2 ∈ Zp and produces Ω′ = g
α/ω2
Ωω1/ω2
. Then A′
sends (Ω,Ω′) to A. Note that if Ω = gabgc = gb1αga1 ,
then Ω′ = gb2αga2 . Alternately, if Ω = gab = gb1α, then
Ω′ = gb2α. Now, if A can identify the correct value of
(Ω,Ω′), then A′ can identify the correct Ω.
Lemma 3. The secret rating of an untrusted user cannot
be compromised.
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Proof. We show that an adversary A will not be able to
find the rating of an untrusted user that does not reveal
its rating. We assume that Pκ is an untrusted user whose
rating A aims to find. A colludes with everyone to learn
the rating vi . A plugs in its suitable secret keys and
ratings on behalf of all the colluding users. The secret
feedback of Pi is (Ci , g
αi ), where Ci = (c1i , c2i), cji =
gxjiyji gbjiαi gajivi , j = 1, 2. Now cjκ = g
xjκyjκgbjκακgajκvκ ,
∀ j ∈ {1, 2}. It is easy to see that
gxjκyjκ = 1/
(∏
k∈[n]\{κ} g
xjkyjk
)
. So, A can calculate gxjκyjκ
with the help of other users. Hence, A will be able to find
vκ only if it can distinguish between the two items A and
B in Table 3
gb1κακga1κ gb1κακ
gb2κακga2κ gb2κακ
A B
Table 3: Values of A and B in Lemma 3.
Using assumption 3, we can say that A and B are hard
to be distinguished.
6.2. Privacy of the Reputation Engine
In this section, we show that no user can deduce whether
or not their rating is going to be included in the tally. That
is the users cannot find whether they are trusted or not.
The Lemma 6 proves that no one except the RE can find
whether a certain user is trusted or untrusted. Lemma
6 is based on the assumption 5. In Lemma 5, we show
that assumption 5 follows from assumption 4. Again, In
Lemma 4, we prove that assumption 4 follows from the
DDH assumption.
Assumption 4. Given g , ga , gb and a Ω ∈ {Ω1,Ω2},
where Ω1 = g
b/a and Ω2 = R, it is hard to decide whether
Ω = Ω1 or Ω = Ω2.
Lemma 4. Assumption 1 implies assumption 4.
Proof. The proof can be found in [52].
Assumption 5. Given g , ga , gb ,m and a challenge Ω ∈
{Ω1,Ω2}, where Ω1 = (1/gam)1/b and Ω2 = (g/gam)1/b,
it is hard to decide whether Ω = Ω1 or Ω = Ω2.
Lemma 5. Assumption 4 implies assumption 5.
Proof. From Assumption 4, we can write (g , ga , gb ,m,
(1/gam)1/b) = (g , ga , gb ,m, (ga/b)−m)
c≈ (g , ga , gb ,m,
(R)−m)
c≈ (g , ga , gb ,m,R) c≈ (g , ga , gb ,m, g1/b ∗ R)
c≈ (g , ga , gb ,m, g1/b(ga/b)−m) c≈ (g , ga , gb ,m, (g/gam)1/b)
Lemma 6. The users cannot find whether they are trusted
or untrusted.
Proof. We show that if a user can find whether it is trusted
or untrusted, then it can break the security of assumption
5. The user Pi chooses a g
a1i and receives ga2i which equals
either (1/gω1a1i )1/ω2 or (g/gω1a1i )1/ω2 . Now, according to
assumption 5, these two values should be indistinguish-
able. Hence, the lemma holds.
6.3. Privacy of Trusted Users
Here, we prove that the rating of a trusted user whose
rating counts, cannot be deduced if it cannot be inferred
from the tally itself. Here, we assume that the RE has
colluded with some of the users to deduce the rating of a
particular user Pˆ . From the discussion of Section 6.1, we
know that if Pˆ is untrusted, that is, if the RE chooses not
to include the rating of Pˆ , then the rating of Pˆ cannot
be compromised. Alternately, if Pˆ is a trusted user then
its rating is included in the tally. Now, Lemma 12 says
that if there exists another honest trusted user P˜ , such
that the ratings of Pˆ and P˜ are different, that is one of
them is 0 and the other one is 1, then the RE will not
be able to deduce the rating of either Pˆ or P˜ . Thus, if
the RE colludes with all but two trusted users, then if the
ratings of two trusted uncompromised users are different,
the RE will not be able to find their ratings. So, the result
of Lemma 12 amounts to saying that the adversary will
not be able to deduce the rating of a trusted user if the
tally does not allow her to infer it. Lemma 12 is based on
the validity of assumption 10. In Lemma 11, we show that
assumption 10 follows from the DDH assumption. We also
require assumption 6, 7, 8, 9, and Lemma 7, 8, 9, 10 to
show the validity of Lemma 11.
Assumption 6. Given g , ga1 , ga2 , gb1 , gb2 , gr1 , gr2 and a
challenge Ω ∈ {ga1b1+a2b2gr1 , ga1b1+a2b2gr2}, it is hard to
decide whether Ω = ga1b1+a2b2gr1 or Ω = ga1b1+a2b2gr2 .
Lemma 7. Assumption 1 implies Assumption 6.
Proof. (g , ga1 , ga2 , gb1 , gb2 , gr1 , gr2 , ga1b1+a2b2gr1)
c≈ (g , ga1 , ga2 , gb1 , gb2 , gr1 , gr2 , ga1b1 ∗ ga2b2gr1)
c≈ (g , ga1 , ga2 , gb1 , gb2 , gr1 , gr2 ,R ∗ ga2b2gr1)
c≈ (g , ga1 , ga2 , gb1 , gb2 , gr1 , gr2 ,R)
c≈ (g , ga1 , ga2 , gb1 , gb2 , gr1 , gr2 ,R ∗ gr2)
c≈ (g , ga1 , ga2 , gb1 , gb2 , gr1 , gr2 ,R ∗ ga2b2gr2)
c≈ (g , ga1 , ga2 , gb1 , gb2 , gr1 , gr2 , ga1b1 ∗ ga2b2gr2)
c≈ (g , ga1 , ga2 , gb1 , gb2 , gr1 , gr2 , ga1b1+a2b2gr2).
Assumption 7. Given g , ω, ω′, ga1 , ga2 , gb1 , gb2 , gr1 , gr2 ,
ga
′
1 , ga
′
2 ,
gr
′
1 , gr
′
2 , such that ωa1 +ω
′a ′1 = ωa2 +ω
′a ′2 = ωb1 +ω
′b′1 =
ωb2 +ω
′b′2 = ωr1 +ω
′r ′1 = ωr2 +ω
′r ′2 = 1, and a challenge
Ω ∈ {Ω1,Ω2}, where Ω1 = (ga1b1+a2b2gr1 , ga′1b1+a′2b2gr ′1)
and Ω2 = (g
a1b1+a2b2gr2 , ga
′
1b1+a
′
2b2gr
′
2), it is hard to de-
cide whether Ω = Ω1 or Ω = Ω2.
Lemma 8. Assumption 6 implies assumption 7.
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Proof. Let us assume A is the adversary against assump-
tion 7. We show how A can be used to construct another
adversary A′ against assumption 6. A′ works as follows:
it receives g , ga1 , ga2 , gb1 , gb2 , gr1 , gr2 and a challenge
Ω ∈ {ga1b1+a2b2gr1 , ga1b1+a2b2gr2}. Then it generates two
random ω1, ω2 ∈ Zp and computes the following items:
ga
′
1 = (g/(ga1)ω)1/ω
′
, ga
′
2 = (g/(ga2)ω)1/ω
′
,
gr
′
1 = (g/(gr1)ω)1/ω
′
, gr
′
2 = (g/(gr2)ω)1/ω
′
A = Ω,A′ = (g
b1gb2g)1/ω
′
Ωω/ω′
.
Note that if Ω = ga1b1+a2b2gr1 then (A,A′) = (ga1b1+a2b2gr1 ,
ga
′
1b1+a
′
2b2gr
′
1). Alternately, if Ω = ga1b1+a2b2gr2 then
(A,A′) = (ga1b1+a2b2gr2 , ga
′
1b1+a
′
2b2gr
′
2). Now, A′ sends
g , ω, ω′, ga1 , ga2 , gb1 , gb2 , gr1 , gr2 , ga
′
1 , ga
′
2 , gr
′
1 , gr
′
2 and (A,A′)
to A. If A can identify the correct (A,A′), then A′ can
use the same to identify the correct Ω.
Assumption 8. Given g , ga , gb , gc and Ω ∈ {g−ab , g−abgc}
it is hard to decide whether Ω = g−ab or Ω = g−abgc.
Lemma 9. Assumption 1 implies assumption 8.
Proof. If there exists an adversary A against assumption
8, then it could be to construct an adversary A′ who with
the help of A can break the security of assumption 1. A
works as follows:
it receives as input g , ga , gb and a challenge Ω ∈ {gab , gabgc}.
It computes g−c = 1/gc ,Ω′ = Ω−1. It now sends ga , gb , g−c
and Ω−1 to A. Note that, if Ω = gab , Ω′ = g−ab and if
Ω = gabgc , then Ω′ = g−abg−c . Now if A can distin-
guish the two possible values of Ω′, A can use that to find
whether Ω = gab or Ω = gabgc .
Assumption 9. Given g , ga , gb , gc , gd , ge , g f , gh and Ω ∈
{Ω1,Ω2}, where Ω1 = (g−abghgcd , gabgef ),Ω2 = (g−abgcd ,
gabghgef ), it is hard to decide whether Ω = Ω1 or Ω = Ω2.
Lemma 10. Assumption 8 implies assumption 9.
Proof. According to assumption 8, given g , ga , gb and gh ,
g−ab
c≈ g−abgh . Thus, Ω1 = (g−abghgcd , gabgef ) =
(g−abghgcd , g
hgef
g−abgh )
c≈ (g−abgcd , ghgef
g−ab ) = Ω2.
Assumption 10. Given g ,A = (ga1 , ga2),B = (gb1 , gb2),
C1 = (gc11 , gc21), C2 = (gc12 , gc22),Σ1 = gα1 ,Σ2 = gα2 ,
R1 = (gr11 , gr21),R2 = (gr12 , gr22), ω = (ω1, ω2) such
that
∑2
i=1 ωirij =
∑2
i=1 ωicij = 1, j ∈ {1, 2}, and Ω ∈
{Ω1,Ω2}, where Ω1 = (U1,U2),Ω2 = (V1,V2),
Ui = (g
−aibi gci1gri1α1 , gaibi gri2α2),
Vi = (g
−aibi gri1α1 , gaibi gci2gri2α2). It is hard to decide
whether Ω = Ω1 or Ω = Ω2.
Lemma 11. Assumption 1 implies assumption 10.
Proof. Using assumption 9, we can write
Ui = (g
−aibi gci1gri1α1 , gaibi gri2α2)
c≈ (g−aibi gri1α1 ,
gaibi gci1gri2α2) = (g−aibi gri1α1 , g
ri1α1+ri2α2gci1
g−ai bi gri1α1 ). Using as-
sumption 7, we can write (g−aibi gri1α1 , g
ri1α1+ri2α2gci1
g−ai bi gri1α1 )
c≈
(g−aibi gri1α1 , g
ri1α1+ri2α2gci2
g−ai bi gri1α1 ) = (g
−aibi gri1α1 , gaibi gci2gri2α2)
= Vi ,∀ i ∈ {1, 2}. Since, assumption 9 and 7 can be re-
duced to assumption 1, the lemma holds.
Lemma 12. No PPT adversary, having an alliance with
the RE, can distinguish between two bulletin boards where
the ratings of two trusted users Pγ and Pδ (γ < δ), who
rated the service provider differently, are mutually inter-
changed.
Proof. Let us assume that A and B are two bulletin boards
where vγ and vδ are interchanged. Since, Pγ and Pδ have
rated the service provider differently, vγ + vδ = 1. We
show that if there exists an adversary A that can distin-
guish between A and B , it could be used to construct an
adversary A′ against assumption 10. A′ works as under:
It receives as input g ,A = (ga1 , ga2),B = (gb1 , gb2), C1 =
(gc11 , gc21), C2 = (gc12 , gc22),Σ1 = gα1 ,Σ2 = gα2 ,R1 =
(gr11 , gr21),R2 = (gr12 , gr22), ω = (ω1, ω2) such that∑2
i=1 ωirij =
∑2
i=1 ωicij = 1, j ∈ {1, 2}, and a chal-
lenge Ω ∈ {Ω1,Ω2}, where Ω1 = {Ui : i = 1, 2},Ω2 =
{Vi : i = 1, 2},Ui = (g−aibi gci1gri1α1 , gaibi gri2α2),Vi =
(g−aibi gri1α1 , gaibi gci2gri2α2). A′ has to identify whether
Ω = Ω1 or Ω = Ω2. A′ lets A choose a subset Λ ⊆
[n]\{γ, δ}. A selects all secret keys and ratings for all users
{Pi : i ∈ Λ}. For the users Pi : i ∈ [n] \ (Λ ∪ {γ, δ}), A′
selects the secret keys and ratings randomly. Then A′ sets
Xγ = (g
a1 , ga2) and Xδ = (g
b1 , gb2). That is A′ implicitly
sets (x1γ , x2γ) = (a1, a2) and (x1δ, x2δ) = (b1, b2). We will
see later thatA′ implicitly sets ajγ = cj1 and ajδ = cj2, j =
1, 2. A′ also implicitly sets bjγ = rj1 and bjδ = rj2, j =
1, 2. For all other n − 2 compromised users, either A′ or
A chooses ga1i randomly and sets ga2i = (gθi/ga1iω1)1/ω2 ,
where θi ∈ {0, 1} and is chosen by eitherA′ orA. Similarly
they choose gb1i randomly and set gb2i = (g/gb1iω1)1/ω2 .
Both A′ and A know the values of a1i , b1i , ω1 and ω2,
which allow them to compute ga2i and gb2i from randomly
chosen ga1i and gb1i respectively. A generates the cryp-
tograms for all the users with indices from the set Λ. It
generates secret key (x1i , x2i) ∈ Z2p and publishes the pub-
lic key Xi = (g
x1i , gx2i ) for all i ∈ Λ. A also produces
cryptogram Ci = (c1i , c2i), for all i ∈ Λ, where cji =
gxjiyji gajivi gbjiαi , j ∈ {1, 2}, gyji = g
∑i−1
k=1 xjk−
∑n
k=i+1 xjk =∏i−1
k=1 g
xjk /
∏n
k=i+1 g
xjk and αi ∈ Zp . A′ also does the
same thing for all users Pi : i ∈ [n] \ (Λ ∪ {γ, δ}). Let,
Ω = (w1,w2), ωj = (w
1
j ,w
2
j ),∀ j ∈ {1, 2}. Then A′ gen-
erates Cγ and Cδ as follows: cjγ = Kj1 ∗ w1j and cjδ =
Kj2 ∗ w2j ,∀ j ∈ {1, 2}.
Here, Kj1 = (g
aj )
∑γ−1
k=1 xjk−
∑δ−1
k=γ+1 xjk−
∑n
k=δ+1 xjk and
Kj2 = (g
bj )
∑γ−1
k=1 xjk+
∑δ−1
k=γ+1 xjk−
∑n
δ+1 xjk . Since, the secret
keys of users Pi : i ∈ [n] \ {γ, δ} are chosen by either
A or A′, they know the values of xjk ,∀ j ∈ {1, 2} and
∀ k ∈ [n] \ {γ, δ}. Hence, they can calculate the values of
Kj1,Kj2,∀ j ∈ {1, 2}, and thus can compute Cγ and Cδ.
Note that, if Ω = Ω1, then Cγ corresponds to the rating
vγ = 1 and Cδ corresponds to the rating vδ = 0. On the
other hand if Ω = Ω2, then vγ = 0 and vδ = 1. If A can
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Entity Computational overhead (number of exponentiations) Communication overhead
Initialization Feedback NIZK Proof Tallying Initialization Feedback NIZK Proof
User 4 5 26 - 4 3 34
RE 2n + 3 - 15n + 10 2 4n + 2 - 18n + 18
Table 4: Protocol Overhead
Operation Computation Cost Communication Cost
Setup - 4n + 2
Key - 2n
Feedback - 3n
NIZKP 56n + 18 exponentiations 52n + 18
Tallying 1 exponentiation 1
Table 5: Cost for Public Verification
distinguish between these two cases, then A′ can use the
same to identify whether Ω = Ω1 or Ω = Ω2. Hence, the
result holds.
7. Evaluation
In this section, we present the computation and band-
width complexity of protocol and provide the benchmark
for each cryptographic operation.
7.1. Complexity Evaluation
In this section, we calculate the computational and the
communication overhead of our scheme. In our scheme,
the most expensive operation is the exponentiation. We
measure the computational overheads in terms of the num-
ber of exponentiations done by an entity. First, we mea-
sure the computational overhead for the RE. The RE se-
lects two random elements ω1 and ω2 and publishes g
ω1
and gω2 , which requires two exponentiations. Again, com-
puting ga2i and gb2i from ga1i and gb1i requires one ex-
ponentiation each, provided g1/ω2 has been computed be-
forehand. The RE computes them for all i ∈ [n]. Thus,
the total number of exponentiations required will be 2n.
The RE computes the NIZK proofs of knowledge of ω1 and
ω2 which require one exponentiation each. Again the RE
computes NIZK proofs of well-formedness of ga2i and gb2i
for all i ∈ [n]. In order for generating NIZK proof of well-
formedness of ga2i , the RE needs to do at most 4 + 7 = 11
exponentiations (4 for the correct proof and 7 for the sim-
ulated proof). Similarly for producing the NIZK proof of
well-formedness of gb2i , the RE needs to do 4 exponenti-
ations. Thus, the RE needs to do 15 exponentiations for
constructing the proof of well-formedness of ga2i and gb2i
for any i ∈ [n]. So, for all users, the total number of expo-
nentiation comes to be 15n. The RE also produces NIZK
proof PWtotal
[
g
∑n
i=1
∑2
j=1 ajiωj = g∆ : ga1i , ga2i , gω1 , gω2
]
which requires 4 exponentiations. Then, at the end of the
protocol, the RE needs to do 2 exponentiations in order
to calculate L. The RE also generates NIZK proof of well-
formedness of L which requires 4 exponentiations. So the
grand total of the number of exponentiations required for
computing all NIZK proofs is equal to 15n + 10 which is
O(n). Note that, we did not count the overhead of check-
ing the NIZK proofs in the calculation of this overhead.
These are separately calculated below.
Now we measure the overhead on each of the users who
participate in the protocol as users. In order to compute
gx1i , gx2i , ga1i , gb1i the user needs to do 4 exponentiations.
Each user does 1 exponentiation to compute gαi and 4
others in order to compute the feedback Ci discussed in
section 5. The zero knowledge proof of knowledge of the
secret key requires 2 exponentiations. The zero-knowledge
proofs of feedback well-formedness and knowledge of secret
parameters require 26 exponentiations. So, the total num-
ber of exponentiation needed by one user is 35. It can be
seen that the communication overhead at the RE is domi-
nated by the size of the NIZK proofs. The RE consumes a
bandwidth of 18n +18 for communicating all NIZK proofs
to the bulletin board. Each of the users requires commu-
nicating 34 items as part of NIZK argument. Hence a user
requires constant communication bandwidth for posting
all the information at her disposal to the bulletin board.
Hence, the total communication overhead of executing the
entire protocol comes to be O(n). Table 6 provides the
computational and communication overheads in a tabular
format. Furthermore, Table 7 shows the overhead on a
public verifier for verifying all the arguments posted on
the bulletin board including the tally. A public verifier
needs to do 56n + 18 exponentiations for verifying all the
NIZK arguments posted on the bulletin board which in-
cludes setup parameters, feedbacks etc. Again if the RE
posts the tally and L, the public verifier can verify the
tally by doing one exponentiation.
7.2. Microbenchmarks
The cryptographic operations of PrivRep include two
major operations: generating cryptograms of responses
and generating non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Each
of these operations involves a number of exponentiation
operations. We now evaluate the computational efficiency
and bandwidth overhead of PrivRep crypto operations by
13
Entity Computational overhead (number of exponentiations) Communication overhead
Initialization Feedback NIZK Proof Tallying Initialization Feedback NIZK Proof
User 40 msec 50 msec 260 msec - 1.7kb 1.3 kb 16.2 kb
RE 23 msec - 160 msec 2 msec 1.8kb - 8.7 kb
Table 6: Protocol Overhead for one user providing feedback for 10 retailers.
Operation Computation Cost Communication Cost
Setup - 1.8 kb
Key - 0.8 kb
Feedback - 1.3 kb
NIZKP 578 msec 24.8kb
Tallying 1 msec 88 kb
Table 7: Cost for Public Verification for 10 users providing the responses for 10 retailers.
providing the microbenchmarks for these cryptographic
operations. We have implemented the protocol operations
in Java on a Windows 10 computer system powered by a
2.5 GHz Intel Core i7 processor. We have used the stan-
dard elliptic curve NIST P-256 for generating the cryp-
tographic parameters of our protocol. The cost for gen-
erating the encrypted response and zero-knowledge proof
for one user is presented in Table 6. The computational
time required for generating the cryptograms and the as-
sociated zero-knowledge proof turns out to be within an
acceptable range and lies below 0.4 sec in total. However,
the NIZK operations are the most expensive operations
among all and require around 0.26 sec. At the RE’s side,
the computational time is also acceptable and all the op-
erations are carried out in less than 0.1 sec. The cost of
public verification is also not high, and the verifier can
confirm the accuracy of the shared responses and protocol
operation in around 0.578 sec for 10 users and 10 retailers
as shown in Table 7. We observe that the computational
time linearly increases with the number of retailers and
is independent of a number of feedback providers in the
system. The computational time is acceptable even for a
large number of retailers as a user only interacts with few
retailers only in a real scenario.
Table 6 and 7 present the bandwidth overheads of our
protocol at the user’s and reputation engine’s side. It can
be seen that the communication overhead is slightly high
for the reputation engine and the user. This high commu-
nication cost is due to the need to transfer large number
of NIZK proofs as each of them require a large number of
arguments to be generated by the prover.
8. Comparison with other Systems
Among the existing protocols for reputation aggrega-
tion, none addresses the problem of secure aggregation
among the selected peers while protecting the identities of
peers in the ‘trusted peers’ list without the use of trusted
setup and other trusted entities. The simplest way to com-
pute the personalized reputation is to send the Secure Sum
[53] request to the preselected ‘trusted’ peers in a dis-
tributed secure multiparty computation model. The se-
lected peers compute the sum by encrypting the responses
and adding some random noise which is later subtracted by
the protocol initiator. The secure sum protocol discloses
the identities of ‘trusted peers’ and cannot ensure privacy
if some peers collude with each other to know the values
of target peers. However, our protocol ensures the privacy
under honest but curious as well as malicious model and
also eradicating the need for randomization. The compu-
tational complexity of the above simple protocol is O(n),
which is the same as the protocol discussed in this pa-
per. The protocol presented in [21] protects the privacy of
users under the honest but curious model and has a com-
putational complexity of O(n). In contrast, our protocol
not only provides personalization but also ensures privacy
protection under the malicious model. [14] uses anony-
mous identities to protect the privacy of the user, how-
ever, our system does not need any anonymous identities
for privacy protection. In [6] Clark et al. proposed a dele-
gation protocol for the users who wants to leave the net-
work by delegating their unfinished task to other trusted
users and has the complexity of O(mn). The system also
considers personalization through the use of collaborative
filtering. In contrast, our protocol has the complexity of
O(m) and can also handle the delegation without relying
on other trusted peers. In [54] Erkin et al. use semi-trusted
party and data packing for personalized reputation and
recommendation and have communication complexity of
O(T .M log N ). The system is not purely decentralized in
its operation and privacy may be compromised if semi-
trusted parties get corrupted. On the other hand, our
proposal is decentralized and is not reliant on any trusted
peers or centralized peers for its operation.
Our work can be compared with the decentralized rep-
utation aggregation scheme based on the blockchain sys-
tem [17]. Though the system presented in [17] preserves
the privacy of users in the malicious model but it does
not consider personalized aggregation. In contrast, our
approach is not only decentralized in its operation, but
it also considers personalization of aggregation of ratings
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provided by the users.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel scheme that allows
personalized computation of reputation of service providers
in an online marketplace. The proposed approach is based
on the semantics of secure multiparty computation and the
non-interactive zero knowledge proof of knowledge. The
personalized reputation of a service provider is computed
by utilizing the private feedback values submitted by the
feedback providers who have had interactions with the ser-
vice providers. The protocol operations are performed in a
decentralized and privacy-preserving manner. We proved
that no computationally bounded adversary will learn any-
thing about the secret inputs (ratings), other than what it
can learn from the output of the protocol, i.e. the overall
reputation score of a service provider. We believe our sys-
tem can be used by any centralized or decentralized mar-
ketplace acting as the reputation engine to compute the
reputation of its users and retailers in a privacy-preserving
way.
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Appendix
Zero Knowledge Proofs of Well-formedness
The section presents NIZK proofs for the Scheme pre-
sented in Section 5.
Proof I: PW 1i
[
g
∑2
j=1 ajiωj ∈ {1, g} : ga1i , ga2i , gω1 , gω2 ,
]
This proof comprises a witness to the statement
σ ≡ g
∑2
j=1 ajiωj ∈ {1, g}, where ga1i , ga2i , gω1 , gω2 are given.
For sake of clarity, we write aji as aj , j = 1, 2. So σ ≡
(ga1ω1+a2ω2 = 1) ∨ (ga1ω1+a2ω2 = g). Hence, σ is an
‘OR’ statement and either of the two constituent state-
ments is true. Let us assume that the first statement is
true, that is: ga1ω1+a2ω2 = 1. Now, a non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof for σ will include a real proof for
the true statement and a simulated proof for the wrong
statement. The prover selects r1, r2 ∈R Zp , and generates
two commitments: com11 = g
r1 , com12 = g
r2 , com13 =
(ga1g)r1(ga2g)r2 . Then the prover selects ch2, res21, res22 ∈R
Zp , and generates com21 = gres21(gω1)ch2 ,
com22 = g
res22(gω2)ch2 and com23 = (g
a1)res21(ga2)res22gch2 .
Let the grand challenge of the NIZK statement be ch.
Let, ch1 = ch − ch2. The prover generates two responses:
res1i = r1i − ch1 ∗ωi , i = 1, 2. Now, the verification equa-
tions are as below:
1. gresij
?
=
comij
(gωj )chi
∀ i , j ∈ {1, 2}.
2. (ga1)res11(ga2)res12
?
= com13.
3. (ga1)res21(ga2)res22
?
= com23
gch2
If the above 6 equations hold, then the NIZK proof is
genuine. In a similar way, NIZK proof can be generated
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when ga1ω1+a2ω2 = g . Here, we skip this due to space re-
striction.
Proof II: PWtotal
[
g
∑n
i=1
∑2
j=1 ajiωj = g∆ : ga1i , ga2i , gω1 , gω2
]
This proof consists of a witness to the fact that the total
number of feedback providers whose feedback actually get
counted is given by ∆. The proof is as following:
Select r1, r2 ∈R Zp . Generate these 3 commitments
com1 = (
∏n
i=1 g
a1i )r1(
∏n
i=1 g
a2i )r2 , com2 = g
r1 and com3 =
gr2 . Let the challenge be ch. Then generate two responses
res1 = r1−ω1 ∗ch, res2 = r2−ω2 ∗ch. The verifier accepts
the proof if the following relations hold:
1. (
∏n
i=1 g
a1i )res1(
∏n
i=1 g
a1i )res2
?
= com1
(g∆)ch
2. gres1
?
= com2
(gω1 )ch
3. gres2
?
= com3
(gω2 )ch
Proof III: PW 2i
[
g
∑2
j=1 bjiωj = g : gb1i , gb2i , gω1 , gω2
]
For the sake of clarity we write bji as bj , j = 1, 2. Generate
three commitments com1 = (g
b1)r1(gb2)r2 , com2 = g
r1 and
com3 = g
r2 . Let the challenge be ch. Generate three
responses res1 = r1 − ω1 ∗ ch, res2 = r2 − ω2 ∗ ch. The
verifier accepts the proof if the following relations hold:
1. (gb1)res1(gb2)res2
?
= com1
gch
2. gres1
?
= com2
(gω1 )ch
3. gres2
?
= com3
(gω2 )ch
Proof IV: Feedback Well-formedness
PW 3i
[
Ci : g
x1i , gx2i , gy1i , gy2i , gb1i , gb2i , gαi , gb1i , gb2i
]
Here, we show how the feedback providers construct a
NIZK proof of feedback well-formedness. The feedback
Ci = 〈c1i , c2i , gα〉 where either of the two statements holds:
1) c1i = g
x1iy1i gb1iαi ∧ c2i = gx2iy2i gb2iαi
2) c1i = g
x1iy1i gb1iαi ga1i ∧ c2i = gx2iy2i gb2iαi ga2i
That is the feedback provider has to prove that either of
the two statements stated above is true. For sake of clar-
ity we write cji as cj , xji as xj , yji as yj , bji as bj , aji as
aj ,∀ j ∈ {1, 2} and αi as α. We need to construct a proof
for the statement;
σ ≡ (c1 = gx1y1gb1α ∧ c2 = gx2y2gb2α) ∨ (c1 = gx1y1gb1αga1
∧ c2 = gx2y2gb2αga2).
The given inputs are these: gx1 , gy1 , gx2 , gy2 , gα, ga1 , ga2 , gb1
and gb2 . Only one of the two statements above is true.
Let us assume that the first statement is true, that is
(c1 = g
x1y1gb1α ∧ c2 = gx2y2gb2α). Hence, the prover will
have to provide a real proof for the first statement and a
simulated proof for the second statement. The prover se-
lects random r1, r2 and computes 3 commitments com11 =
gr1 , com12 = g
r2 , com13 = (g
y1)r1(gb1)r2 , com ′11 = g
r ′1 , com ′12 =
gr
′
2 , com ′13 = (g
y2)r
′
1(gb2)r
′
2 . Then the prover selects ran-
dom ch2, res21, res22, res
′
21, res
′
22 ∈R Zp and computes these
commitments:
com21 = g
res21(gx1)ch2 , com22 = g
res22(gα)ch2 ,
com23 = (g
y1)res21(gb1)res22(c1/g
a1)ch2 and
com ′21 = g
res′21(gx2)ch2 , com ′22 = g
res′22(gα)ch2 ,
com ′23 = (g
y2)res
′
21(gb2)res
′
22(c2/g
a2)ch2 .
Now let ch be the grand challenge of the NIZK proof, ob-
tained by feeding all the above parameters into a hash
function. Let, ch1 = ch − ch2. The prover computes
res11 = r1 − x1 ∗ ch1, res12 = r2 − α ∗ ch1, res ′11 = r ′1 −
x2 ∗ ch1, res ′12 = r ′2 − α ∗ ch1. The verification equations
are as follows:
1. gresi1
?
= comi1
(gx1 )chi
, i = 1, 2
2. gresi2
?
= comi2
(gα)chi
, i = 1, 2
3. gres
′
i1
?
=
com′i1
(gx2 )chi
, i = 1, 2
4. gres
′
i2
?
=
com′i2
(gα)chi
, i = 1, 2
5. (gy1)res11(gb1)res12
?
= com13
c
ch1
1
6. (gy1)res21(gb1)res22
?
= com23
(c1/ga1 )ch2
7. (gy2)res
′
11(gb2)res
′
12
?
=
com′13
c
ch1
2
8. (gy2)res
′
21(gb2)res
′
22
?
=
com′23
(c2/ga2 )ch2
If all the above 12 equations satisfy, the NIZK state-
ment is true. Similarly, the prover can generate a NIZK
proof statement if the second statement is true, that is:
(c1 = g
x1y1gb1αga1 ∧ c2 = gx2y2gb2αga2). Here, we omit
this due to space restriction.
Proof V: PWT [L : cˆ1, cˆ2, g
ω1 , gω2 ] This proof consists of
a witness to the fact that L = cˆω11 cˆ
ω2
2 , given g
ω1 and gω2 .
It can be easily seen that this proof is similar to Proof III
discussed above.
Proof VI (Schnorr Signature): We have used this Sc-
norr signature zero knowledge proof [39] many times in
our paper. Here we provide a generic construction for this
kind of zero knowledge proofs. Here, the prover wants to
prove knowledge of a secret variable x , where X = gx is
given. We show how the prover can construct this NIZK
proof. The prover selects random r ∈R Zp and generates
a commitment com = gr . Let, the random challenge be
ch. The prover generates a response res = r − ch ∗ x . The
verification equation is as follows:
gres
?
=
com
X ch
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